On November 11th, 2009, the New York Times reported that in December 2007, top executives at Blackwater (currently known as Xe) authorized cash payments up to $1 million to Iraqi officials with the intent to buy silence and support from the Iraqi government over the Nisour Square shootings on September 16th, 2007, in which 17 Iraqis were shot and killed by Blackwater guards. The Times received this information from four anonymous former Blackwater executives. Two participated in talks about the payments and the other two had heard about the payments from other Blackwater officials. According to the executives, the payoffs were approved by then-company president, Gary Jackson. The money was sent to a top manager in Iraq and one executive stated that the intended recipients were officials in the Iraqi Interior Ministry in charge of operating licenses.
After the Nisour Square shootings, Blackwater came under plenty of heat from media and the Iraqi government, which wanted the contractor out of Iraq. For Blackwater, getting booted from Iraq meant potentially losing lucrative Department of State (DOS) contracts.
The four executives do not know if the bribes ever reached their intended recipients and it is unclear if a federal grand jury in North Carolina is investigating the matter. If it is found that Blackwater bribed Iraqi officials, those responsible could be prosecuted for obstruction of justice and violation of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which prohibits bribes to foreign officials.
Blackwater seems to be synonymous with “bad news” but perhaps the worst news is that the company – despite a growing list of human rights violations and various misdeeds – is not being held to account but rather is still winning new contracts with the U.S. Government. Perhaps what makes Blackwater and other private military and security companies (PMSCs) so bold and reckless is the culture of impunity in which they operate. The U.S. Government did not create mechanisms of accountability and regulation to keep up with the booming industry. But this is one area of corporate accountability with a clear record – the FCPA is a proven tool leaving no excuse for prosecutors to turn the other cheek. All that needs to be done is for the relevant U.S. attorneys to investigate.
On Monday, Amnesty International release a report on the death penalty in Iraq, pointing out that at least 1,000 people are now on death row in Iraq, and 150 of them have exhausted all appeals and could be hanged at any time. The report tells a familiar tale, of how combining a hugely flawed criminal justice system with capital punishment leads for major injustices. One of the focuses of the Amnesty report, and a focus of the CNN report above, is the case of Samar Sa’ad ‘Abdullah, who may face execution for the killing of three family members despite having been severely beaten into confessing to the crime.
When Saddam Hussein was in power, his government carried out executions “on a very large scale”, both judicially and extra-judicially. Ironically, with the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, Interim Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) head Paul Bremer (remember him?) imposed a moratorium on executions, and it was only after the new Iraqi government took power that executions restarted. This included, in December 2006, the execution of Saddam Hussein himself.
Iraq has already executed many people this year (executions sometimes take place in secret, so the exact number is not known). It is known that 12 people were executed on May 3, and 19 more were executed on June 10. Although Iraqi President Jalal Talabani is personally opposed to the death penalty, he delegates decisions on Presidential pardons to his deputies who have no such qualms. With its rapidly expanding death row and the large numbers now out of legal options, the number of hangings could soon increase exponentially.
September 16, 2009 will be the second anniversary of the Nisour Square shootings, in which six Blackwater (now Xe) personnel shot and killed 17 Iraqi civilians outside Baghdad’s green zone. The bad media which surrounded the incident galvanized the U.S. Government to take some steps towards ensuring that the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State (DOS) better regulate PMSC operations in Iraq. But was it enough?
The six Blackwater guards who allegedly indiscriminately opened fire in Nisour Square on September 16, 2007 were finally indicted late last year. The trial hasn’t even started but Blackwater/XE personnel are already implicated in another incident. On May 5, 2009, four Blackwater/Xe personnel reportedly shot and killed two Afghan civilians in Kabul. So much for lessons learned in Iraq; so much for regulation, oversight, and accountability.
However, the U.S. government should not keep pushing aside the questions of how to effectively regulate and where to set the limits on using PMSCs — especially with the increased number of contractors flooding into Afghanistan in the wake of the planned surge in troops. The longer it takes for the U.S. government to finally take a position and answer these questions, the longer PMSCs operate in a legal limbo, in which they may commit human rights abuses with impunity.
The article also mentions that government officials are concerned about serious issues of accountability when contractors are brought into covert and lethal operations. Where there is no transparency, accountability will be near impossible if a crime were committed during those operations. The past administration has been quick to invoke several legal reasons to withhold sensitive information from the public — from the Glomar response to claiming that releasing detainee abuse photos would be against the Geneva Conventions. When the same photos were about to be released in May 2009, the Obama administration sought to block their release arguing that the images could further inflame anti-American opinion. If it is already this difficult to get information out of government agencies, then imagine the difficulty of obtaining information for the purpose of accountability when there’s a private contract involved in a sensitive national operation.
Another area of great concern that the New York Times article briefly touches upon is whether, aside from the concerns about accountability for PMSCs in such a program, PMSCs should be involved in the first place? As Senator Diane Feinstein (CA) aptly states, “It is too easy to contract out work that you don’t want to accept responsibility for”. In the debate about the use of PMSCs in modern warfare, there is the pressing question of what functions a government can and cannot outsource. In U.S. statute and policy, inherently governmental functions are loosely defined as “a function so intimately related to the public interest” that it must be performed by Federal employees. The list of functions that fall under “inherently governmental” is also extremely inconsistent, varying from agency to agency. Because of this lack of a clear and consistent definition, PMSCs are contracted to perform duties in highly sensitive areas such as intelligence and now, even assassinations.
To better regulate the industry, Congress also needs to pass legislation that will close the legal vacuum in which PMSCs are operating and appropriate more resources to regulation and oversight. The U.S. government currently does not adequately regulate the industry and its statutes to hold PMSCs accountable for crimes overseas are few. In its June 2009 Interim Report, the Commission on Wartime Contracting finds that U.S. government oversight of PMSCs is inadequate. Because they mostly operate transnationally, jurisdiction can become a problem. While PMSCs contracted by the DOD can be held accountable under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), contractors hired by other agencies such as the DOS often fall through legal gaps.
The foundation to improve regulation, oversight and accountability of PMSCs has already been set. To close legal gaps such as the one in MEJA, legislation has been proposed in the past and we look forward to similar legislation in the 111th Session of Congress. As for clarifying definitions of “inherently governmental functions”, a bipartisan Commission on Wartime Contracting was established in Public Law 110-181 to recommend among other things improvements in its Final Report on the “process for determining which functions are inherently governmental and which functions are appropriate for performance by contractors in a contingency operation, especially whether providing security in an area of combat operations is inherently governmental.” On an international level, the UN Working Group on Mercenaries (UNWGM) completed its two-week visit to the U.S. on August 3rd, 2009. During that time, the UNWGM met with the DOJ, members of Congress, governmental officials and public interest groups to discuss how PMSCs can be regulated on international, regional, national and local levels. Such efforts are all a step in the right direction.
Their operations are vast and war zone contractors are likely here to stay, as Suzanne Simons writes in her CNN International article. Her article is a comprehensive piece that places emphasis on one of the more salient issues regarding private military and security companies (PMSCs) or contractors: lack of regulation, oversight, and accountability. The PMSC industry has grown rapidly since the war on terror and continues to play an integral role in the conflict in Afghanistan under the Obama administration, but the US government, as reported by the CWC in its Interim Report, lacks resources to manage the industry that it has come to depend on like a crutch.
Since 2001, Congress has appropriated about $830 billion to fund U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Over that period, America’s reliance on contractors has grown to unprecedented proportions to support logistics, security, and reconstruction efforts related to those operations. More than 240,000 contractor employees—about 80 percent of them foreign nationals—now work in Iraq and Afghanistan, supporting the Department of Defense. Additional contractor employees support the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development.
The result from the combination of a growing military industry and weak government regulation and oversight is a culture of impunity and lack of accountability for the many human rights abuses committed by PMSCs. Yes, five Blackwater guards will be tried in February 2010 for opening fire and killing civilians in Nisour Square and yes, a private civil lawsuit was filed against Blackwater contractor Andrew J. Moonen for killing one of the Iraqi Vice President’s bodyguards in Baghdad’s green zone. However, let us also keep in mind not only how long it took for the Department of Justice (DOJ) to act in the first case, but also the fact that numerous cases of detainee abuse committed by PMSC personnel have gone unprosecuted. In February 2008, Amnesty found out through Senator Durbin’s inquiry to the DOJ that 24 cases of detainee abuse were transferred to the Eastern District of Virginia; 22 of the 24 were dismissed and 2 are pending. Our efforts to find out why these cases were dismissed or unresolved were fruitless.
The industry cannot be expected to regulate itself and a government that is increasingly outsourcing its operations needs to ensure that it has the mechanisms to regulate PMSCs’ activities and hold the companies accountable for their actions (and not reward them with more contracts). Doug Brooks of the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) stated that PMSCs are here to stay and that it’s about time we made it work but after the recent completion of a twelfth version of IPOA’s Code of Conduct, the trade association still has not made it work. Essentially, the Code is ineffectual. For starters, there are no guidelines detailing what compliance with its standards entails; companies do not have to show that they are operationalizing the Code to IPOA or any third-party monitor; and there are no requirements for public reporting on company efforts to adhere to the Code.
This is why the U.S. government will have to move beyond the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) to create a new body of legislation that will hold all U.S. government contractors working overseas accountable – irrespective of which government agency employs them – if they commit human rights violations.
Four Uighur former Guantanamo inmates are now in Bermuda, other detainees have been released to France, Chad, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Hungary, Italy and Palau appear to have joined the ranks of countries prepared to accept detainees cleared for release. The pace of releases finally seems to be picking up and that is a cause for optimism.
But, while groups like Amnesty are pleased to see these individuals finally released from wrongful detention, we are disturbed that there has been no public announcement that any of these individuals will receive compensation for their ill-treatment or any assistance from the United States in rebuilding their lives or coming to terms with their experiences.
Consider for a moment what the men recently released have lost. They have lost seven years of their lives. Quite apart from the personal deprivation of liberty that is also seven years of lost earning potential – one fifth of a working life. Their families too have been without their primary breadwinner all this time.
Furthermore, what kind of future do they have to look forward to? They certainly haven’t had the opportunity to learn or develop a trade while in detention, nor are many of them returning to a society they know well. Some may not even speak the local language. However idyllic Bermuda may appear in press photographs, it is a world away from the Central Asian steppe the Uighurs are used to.
Some released inmates may be grappling with medical or mental health problems. Defense attorney, Jeffrey Colman, a thirty-five year veteran of the criminal justice system who has represented four GITMO inmates this week described the facility as:
“Unlike any other institution… there is a level of hopelessness unlike anything I have ever seen.”
We know 5 inmates have committed suicide since the camp opened and in March this year the Department of Defense reported that 34 inmates were on hunger strike. Such figures give some insight into the harrowing nature of the detainees’ experiences – yet no provision has been made to support their rehabilitation.
Closing Guantanamo is not in and of itself enough. We have a moral and legal obligation to aid the reintegration of former inmates back into society. These men have been convicted of no crime. In our system that means they are innocent. No ifs or buts.
Innocent men wrongly held for seven years have a right to compensation. The Obama administration can’t simply shove them out the gates of Camp Delta and forget about them. The United States must take responsibility for rebuilding lives it has ruined.
On Monday, March 9, the Iraqi government announced to Amnesty International that 128 death sentences have been ratified, and that executions would commence soon at the rate of 20 per week. Exactly who these 128 people are, what crimes they have been condemned for, or how imminent these executions are is not known. It is also now known how many of these prisoners facing execution might have been transferred to Iraqi authorities from US custody following the Status of Forces Agreement that came into effect at the beginning of this year.
What is known is that Iraqi trials do not always conform to international fair trial standards.
Ironically, a moratorium on executions was in place in Iraq while it was under US occupation, but that came to an end in August of 2004. It is not known how many executions have taken place since then (at least 65 in 2006, at least 33 in 2007 and at least 34 in 2008). By any measure, 128 executions, or 20 executions a week, would be a disturbing demonstration of enthusiasm for state killing in a country trying to recover from years of violent upheaval.
Tonight just after 10 pm EST, Condoleeza Rice’s former history professor will argue in a debate with Colorado State Senator Shawn Mitchell that the former Secretary of State should be tried as a war criminal.
The webcast debate will follow a showing of the documentary film Courting Condi, which follows Ms. Rice’s path from a childhood in segregated Birmingham, Alabama to her former post as U.S. Secretary of State.
The film depicts Rice’s defense of Guantanamo and the invasion of Iraq, and her apparent approval of the use of torture of detainees, but also revisits a host of other debacles including her role on the board of Chevron during the company’s extraction of oil in Nigeria amidst extreme violence and shareholder action for the company to engage with the Nigerian government, helping to bring down affirmative action at Stanford, and turning the other cheek in the face of hundreds of thousands of victims of Katrina in the Gulf Coast.
Importantly, the film tackles the issue of impunity of private security contractors (Blackwater) who shot and killed civilians in Baghdad in 2007. While an update to my interview in the film on this topic should note that now there has been an indictment brought against the guards, and at least arguably, contractors in Iraq no longer enjoy the immunity from Iraqi prosecution they did at the time of filming, the need for oversight and adequate regulation, also highlighted by Rep. David Price, still persists.
You can watch a q-and-a with the film’s producer at 10:15 pm EST, and the debate at 10:30 EST, here:
I should have felt triumphant when I returned from Iraq in August 2006. Instead, I was worried and exhausted. My team of interrogators had successfully hunted down one of the most notorious mass murderers of our generation, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq and the mastermind of the campaign of suicide bombings that had helped plunge Iraq into civil war. But instead of celebrating our success, my mind was consumed with the unfinished business of our mission: fixing the deeply flawed, ineffective and un-American way the U.S. military conducts interrogations in Iraq. I’m still alarmed about that today.
Today, let’s start with the yesterday’s coverage of the letter signed by Defense Department Deputy Secretary Gordon England, stating that companies, including Blackwater, working on State Department Diplomatic Security contracts were not engaged in “employment in support of the DOD mission”.
Though it seems Mr. England is quite clear on this point, others are not, and have been debating it literally for years. (It’s an important point because it’s the part of the law that gives the DOJ jurisdiction over the contractors.)
What happens next in court might explain why there has been such a delay in getting to this brink of accountability in the first place – someone has to finally figure out what “the mission” in Iraq is. Maybe there were/are many missions. Once the court gets that sorted out, I suppose the next step will be to interpret the now famous (infamous?) Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act to decipher what is meant by “supporting a DOD mission,” and finally to decide whether Blackwater was doing that.
These decisions could have sweeping implications not only for the state of US law and foreign policy, but also in interpreting the recently enacted US-Iraq Security Agreement, and possibly setting the State and Defense Departments on a trajectory of cooperative regulation of companies they contract – something, despite all the hoopla over Blackwater these days, that has yet to happen.
In the last few years, several reports have revealed the dangers of failing to properly secure and manage weapons in Iraq. For example, described in a November 2008 Amnesty report, some members of Iraqi insurgent groups have infiltrated the Iraqi police force and used police arms to carry out serious human rights abuses. U.S. military officials have also accused Iraqi security guards of stealing hundreds of weapons in 2006 at arms depots such as Taji National Army Depot (NAD).
While there have been significant strides in improving the accountability of U.S. provided weapons in Iraq as well as helping Iraqi authorities properly manage arms and ammunition under their control, a few areas such as the accountability for captured weapons and NVDs still need focused attention.
According to the DoD Inspector General’s report, only around 20,000 of the estimated 80,000 captured weapons stored at various depot locations throughout Iraq had been processed. Processing includes having the weapon’s serial number recorded and inspecting the quality of the weapon. Some of the unprocessed arms are at the Taji NAD and Kirkush Military Training Base among others.
In addition, the DoD Inspector General raised concerns about the accountability of U.S. issued night vision devices (NVD) to the Iraqi security forces. NVD receive extra scrutiny under DoD regulations because they significantly increase a fighting forces’ tactical ability. A DoD investigation showed 26,000 NVDs lacked proper documentation, raising the risk of loss or theft similar to captured weapons.
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